I. INTRODUCTION
M ultinational corporations (MNCs) face the challenge of, and opportunity for, multijurisdictional tax planning (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010; Desai, 2009) . One primary goal of multijurisdictional planning is to allocate as much taxable income as possible to low-tax jurisdictions, thereby minimizing corporate income tax (Clausing, 2009) . While all MNCs have the opportunity to take advantage of this strategy, MNCs with parent corporations incorporated outside the United States, and in particular in tax havens, may have more options available to them (Desai and Hines, 2002) . This is because the U.S. corporate residence rule permits a fi rm incorporated outside the United States to avoid U.S. taxpayer status, even if it is headquartered and managed in the United States (Shaviro, 2011) . Therefore, using a tax-haven-incorporated parent may help U.S.-headquartered MNCs avoid the perceived burdens and anticompetitive features of the U.S. corporate tax system (Donmoyer, 1999; Samuels, 2009 ) and reduce tax on U.S. and non-U.S. income (U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), 2002). As a result, prior researchers have predicted an increase in U.S.-headquartered fi rms incorporating in tax havens as a response to onerous U.S. federal income tax rules (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010, Shaviro, 2011) .
This paper considers the issue of the incorporation location choice of fi rms that conduct initial public offerings (IPOs) on U.S. markets. Specifi cally, it examines whether U.S.-headquartered MNCs incorporate in tax havens prior to an IPO. We fi rst consider the hypothesis that U.S.-headquartered MNCs incorporate parent corporations in tax-haven jurisdictions, and fi nd that they rarely do so. In particular, only 27 fi rms, or about 3 percent of the 918 U.S.-headquartered MNCs that we identify, incorporate in tax havens. We also briefl y consider the possibility that U.S.-headquartered MNCs may incorporate in non-U.S., non-tax-haven jurisdictions and fi nd only minimal evidence of this practice in our sample. We next consider whether U.S.-headquartered fi rms are responsible for the previously documented increase in the proportion of fi rms conducting U.S. IPOs that are incorporated in tax havens (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010) . We fi nd that fi rms headquartered in China and Hong Kong, as opposed to U.S.-headquartered fi rms, are largely responsible for the increase. Finally, we list and describe some features of the U.S.-headquartered fi rms that are incorporated in tax havens, and suggest possible directions for future research.
Section II discusses the different incorporation options for MNCs and the associated costs and benefi ts. Section III documents our study design, and section IV our results. Section V concludes.
II. U.S.-HEADQUARTERED MNCs' INCORPORATION DECISIONS

A. U.S. versus Tax Haven Incorporation
A U.S.-headquartered MNC faces the choice of whether to incorporate its parent entity in the United States or in a non-U.S. jurisdiction. In this paper we focus on the choice between U.S. and tax-haven incorporation. This is consistent with the hypothesis that if a U.S.-headquartered fi rm incorporates outside the United States in response to onerous tax rules, it will do so in a tax haven. We consider fi rms' incorporation decisions prior to the IPO rather than transactions involving inversions of stand-alone U.S.-parented fi rms into non-U.S.-parented structures.
We begin by discussing the existing laws and incentives that affect U.S.-headquartered, U.S.-incorporated fi rms and U.S.-headquartered, tax-haven-incorporated fi rms. We then consider the possibility that incentives to incorporate a tax haven parent have changed or will change over time. Finally, we discuss several non-tax considerations relevant to incorporation decisions.
B. Tax Structure Options for U.S.-Headquartered MNCs
Taxation of MNCs with U.S. Parent
Corporations incorporated in the United States, for example in a U.S. state such as Delaware, are subject to U.S. federal income tax on worldwide income. Because the U.S. tax rules treat separately incorporated affi liates as separate taxpayers, non-U.S. corporate subsidiaries of a U.S. parent are not automatically required to pay U.S. federal income tax. However, a U.S.-parented MNC must currently pay U.S. tax on the income of its foreign subsidiaries to the extent it falls into "subpart F income" categories, which include certain mobile and passive income. When income is repatriated from non-U.S. corporate subsidiaries as dividend distributions, the dividends are included in the income of the U.S. parent. U.S. federal income tax imposed on repatriations, including subpart F inclusions and dividend distributions, is subject to reduction under applicable foreign tax credit rules. A proportion of foreign income taxes paid by non-U.S. corporate subsidiaries is deemed paid by a U.S. parent upon the U.S. parent's inclusion of subpart F income or dividend distributions, and these deemed paid foreign taxes can result in foreign tax credits (Isenbergh, 2009) .
Like all taxpayers, U.S-parented MNCs face an incentive to engage in tax planning to reduce or defer the amount of U.S. and non-U.S. tax they have to pay. International tax planning differs signifi cantly from fi rm to fi rm. However, a typical structure for a U.S.-parented MNC features a U.S. parent corporation, with one or more non-U.S. intermediate holding corporations incorporated in a tax haven or other low-tax jurisdiction, which are owned by the United States parent or by U.S. affi liates of the U.S. parent. The non-U.S. low-tax intermediate holding corporations then own one or more non-U.S. corporate operating subsidiaries (Fleming, Peroni, and Shay, 2009; Kleinbard, 2011a) . These structures are facilitated by "check-the-box" entity classifi cation rules fi nalized by the United States in 1996 (Kleinbard, 2011a) .
U.S.-parented MNCs may take advantage of this type of structure by using transfer pricing to construct intercompany transactions in a way that allocates income to the low-tax intermediate holding corporation(s) rather than to the United States or other jurisdictions that assert the right to tax other members of the MNC corporate group. For example, profi t may be allocated to a low-tax intermediate holding affi liate because the low-tax affi liate is the owner, for tax purposes, of the MNC's non-U.S. intellectual property (Shay, 2004) . The sharing of research and development payments under the so-called "cost sharing" regulations and the transfer of intellectual property offshore at relatively low valuations under the so-called "buy-in" regulations facilitate the ownership of intellectual property by non-U.S. subsidiaries (Brauner, 2008) . In addition, MNCs may structure intercompany transactions and external transactions such as contract manufacturing in a way that avoids the characterization of the low-tax affi liate's income as subpart F income. For example, the low-tax affi liate can be deemed to own a manufactured product throughout its manufacturing process until it is sold to a customer (Roin, 2008) . Strategies such as these may permit U.S.-parented MNCs to allocate not only non-U.S. income, but also U.S. income, to low-taxed non-U.S. affi liates, and conversely to allocate deductions to U.S. parents (Clausing, 2009; Grubert, 2012) .
U.S.-parented MNCs may also use foreign-tax-credit planning to ensure that their repatriations are sheltered from taxation. For example, they may choose to pay dividends from high-taxed rather than low-taxed subsidiaries, generating higher deemed paid foreign taxes. This strategy can shield both dividends and payments other than dividends, such as royalties, from non-U.S. tax (Grubert and Altshuler, 2008) . Such MNCs may also use structures that maximize benefi ts under bilateral income tax treaties and non-U.S. tax laws and ensure that intercompany payments such as royalties and interest are not subject to non-U.S. withholding tax and/or are deductible under non-U.S. income tax law. In addition, alternatives to dividend repatriation, including intercompany loans and "blending" dividends from high-tax and low-tax affi liates, are correlated with the prospect of a high tax liability imposed on dividend repatriation (Altshuler and Grubert, 2002) .
As a result of this planning, prior research fi nds that U.S.-parented MNCs pay low rates of U.S. tax on non-U.S. income earned in non-U.S. subsidiaries. For example, in 2007, U.S.-parented MNCs paid about $18.1 billion in U.S. tax with respect to non-U.S. income. This represented an average 3.3 percent residual U.S. tax burden on such income based on 2007 Treasury tax return data (Costa and Gravelle, 2012) . Grubert and Mutti (2001) develop a broader model that calculates the U.S. tax burden on non-U.S. income in U.S.-parented MNC structures including not only taxes remitted but also "excess burden," or deadweight loss. Using this model, based in part on 1992 Treasury tax return data, Altshuler and Grubert (2001) estimate that the effective U.S. tax rate for the non-U.S. income of U.S.-parented MNCs is approximately 5.4 percent. This estimate includes a 1.7 percent "excess burden" deadweight loss generated by unrepatriated earnings in non-U.S. jurisdictions with an effective tax rate below 10 percent, a result that is consistent with other research (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2001 ). Grubert and Altshuler (2008) have also raised the possibility that the "implicit costs of deferral" may be greater than 1.7 percent for some fi rms.
Several costs contribute to the excess burden or deadweight loss of sequestering earnings offshore. For example, lower than optimal dividend payments may limit the ways in which earnings may be invested (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2001) . Additionally, maintaining non-business assets offshore may increase a fi rm's cost of capital (BryantKutcher, Eiler, and Guenther, 2008) . Finally, the fi rm directly incurs tax planning costs including the expense of creating an offshore structure and maintaining multiple affi liates and intercompany relationships and payments (Slemrod and Blumenthal, 1996) .
Taxation of MNCs with Tax-Haven Parent
An alternative structure features a MNC headquartered in the United States, but whose parent is incorporated in a tax haven that imposes a very low, often zero, rate of corporate income tax. The tax-haven parent typically owns a U.S. subsidiary that houses the U.S. management and U.S. business operations of the fi rm, and also owns other subsidiaries incorporated in non-U.S. jurisdictions (Treasury, 2002) . The U.S. rule for corporate tax residence turns on incorporation location, not on the location of management and control (Shaviro, 2011) . As a result, a tax-haven-parented MNC avoids exposure to U.S. federal income tax on non-U.S. business income, including subpart F income, earned by non-U.S. subsidiaries (Desai and Hines, 2002) .
As mentioned earlier, a U.S.-parented MNC may attempt to allocate not only non-U.S. income, but also U.S. income, to low-taxed non-U.S. subsidiaries (Clausing, 2009; Grubert, 2012) . This allocation may lessen the value of tax-haven incorporation. However, tax-haven-parented fi rms, at least in some cases, have an advantage with respect to this kind of tax planning. Seida and Wempe (2004) and Desai and Hines (2002) suggest that a key benefi t of a successful tax-haven-parented MNC structure is the use of earningsstripping strategies, under which a U.S. subsidiary makes deductible interest or other payments to its tax-haven parent to reduce the amount of income subject to U.S. tax. In other words, a tax-haven-parented MNC structure may facilitate the reduction of tax on U.S. income compared to a U.S.-parented MNC structure. In recognition of this issue, a perennial U.S. legislative proposal would tighten anti-earnings-stripping rules for tax-haven-parented MNCs created in inversion transactions (Solomon, 2012) .
Prior research provides some evidence of the benefi ts provided by the tax-havenparented structure. Seida and Wempe (2004) fi nd evidence that earnings stripping by U.S. fi rms that inverted into tax-haven-parented structures, prior to the enactment of the 2004 anti-inversion rules, resulted in lower post-inversion effective tax rates for the inverted fi rms compared to a control sample. Cloyd, Mills, and Weaver (2003) fi nd no systematic increase in company valuation following the announcement of an inversion, but Desai and Hines (2002) observe that the markets exhibit more positive reactions to inversions in the presence of greater leverage. The research suggests that a taxhaven-parented structure provides tangible tax savings to some fi rms, which investors positively value.
Changing from a U.S.-parent to a tax-haven-parent structure is costly, as the applicable rules typically require shareholders to recognize gain (but prevent the recognition of loss) upon such an inversion (Treasury, 2002) . Moreover, such a change is sometimes impossible. Under Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code, an anti-inversion provision enacted in 2004, a MNC is still treated as a U.S.-parented fi rm even after acquisition by a foreign corporation if: (1) at least 80 percent of the foreign corporation's stock is owned by former owners of the U.S. parent (by reason of their former ownership of the U.S. parent); and (2) the fi rm lacks "substantial business activities" in the country in which the new foreign parent is incorporated (Vanderwolk, 2010) . Strategic acquisitions continue to provide a path to inversion (Wells, 2012) . However, other recently used strategies, such as expatriation to a country where a fi rm arguably has substantial business activities (Webber, 2011) have been curtailed by recent regulations limiting the defi nition of substantial business activities.The diffi culty of changing incorporation location for an existing U.S.-incorporated fi rm may increase the incentive for fi rms to incorporate in a tax haven at inception.
C. Increasing Tax-Haven Incorporation Incentives?
The differences between the federal taxation of U.S.-parented and tax-haven-parented MNCs are not new. But it has been argued that, over time, the differences have become more likely to lead to U.S.-headquartered MNCs opting for tax-haven parents, including at the time of initial incorporation (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010; Shaviro, 2011) . One reason is the asserted increased ease, attributable to communications and other technological developments, of "decentering" companies, or placing fi nancial, organizational, and managerial "homes" in different countries (Desai, 2009 (Desai, , p. 1277 . Another reason cited for an increased incentive for MNCs to incorporate outside the United States is that other countries have lowered their corporate income tax rates, relative to the United States, partially in an attempt to attract foreign direct investment (Altshuler and Grubert, 2006; Shaviro, 2011) . A comparison of the statutory corporate income tax rate imposed by the United States to the statutory rates imposed by other countries reveals that the top U.S. statutory rate of 35 percent substantially exceeds the mean Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) rate of 25 percent, and is much greater than the typical tax-haven rate of 0 percent (Sullivan, 2011) . Another factor that fi rms may consider in connection with tax-haven incorporation is the possibility of future changes in U.S. tax law. For example, in the wake of perceived abuse of the cost-sharing and buy-in regulations mentioned above, the U.S. government adopted revised regulations that had the effect of allocating deductions away from a U.S. parent corporation (in the case of regulations applicable to stock option costs) or allocating income to a parent corporation (in the case of platform contribution transaction buy-in pricing regulations) (Nadal, 2009 ). Use of a tax-haven parent avoids the possibility that similar rules reducing the ability of a U.S. parent to shift profi ts to low-tax subsidiaries will adversely affect a fi rm.
Another reform proposal would change the U.S. corporate income tax system to implement worldwide consolidation, or the current taxation of U.S.-parented MNCs on all of the income generated by non-U.S. subsidiaries (Kleinbard, 2011b) , or at least on the income generated by low-taxed non-U.S. subsidiaries (White House and U.S. Treasury, 2012). Such a worldwide consolidation reform would not affect the U.S. federal income taxation of tax haven-parented MNCs.
However, there is also the risk that future tax laws may make tax-haven incorporation less desirable. For example, passage of a "managed and controlled" test for determining corporate residence could signifi cantly undermine the strategy of tax-haven incorporation (Kleinbard, 2011b) . Alternatively, rules directed specifi cally at low-taxed parents of U.S. subsidiaries could undo much of the benefi t of, for example, earnings-stripping planning (Solomon, 2012) . That said, a tax-haven-parented MNC could presumably domesticate and change into a U.S.-parented MNC if it concluded that the tax-havenparented structure no longer offered suffi cient advantages.
D. Non-tax Considerations
Non-tax incentives, most importantly capital markets and related corporate governance concerns, can also affect a fi rm's choice of country of incorporation. Non-U.S. incorporation does not offer the benefi t of access to Delaware corporate governance law (Kane and Rock, 2008) , and this lack of access may translate into lower investor confi dence in management (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009) . Related research on the reasons for cross-listing indicates that cross-listed fi rms trade at a premium because their willingness to comply with stricter accounting, disclosure and other rules serves as a "bonding" signal that reassures investors about low agency costs (Litvak, 2007) .
More specifi c regulatory concerns may also play a role. Certain regulations, like those applicable to the airline industry, may favor U.S.-incorporated fi rms (Dobson and McKinney, 2009 ). On the other hand, incorporation outside the United States could facilitate listing outside the United States and the avoidance of some U.S. securities reporting requirements (Litvak, 2007) , or could loosen applicable insurance regulations (Elliott, 2005) or shipping law requirements (Semerono, 2000) .
These non-tax considerations, together with opportunities for U.S.-incorporated fi rms to reduce U.S. tax under existing law, may affect the expected benefi ts of taxhaven incorporation for some fi rms. However, as pointed out in other research (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010; Shaviro, 2011) , tax-haven incorporation still appears to offer many fi rms the prospect of avoiding a small current U.S. tax on non-U.S. income and the possibility of eroding the U.S. tax base through earnings-stripping strategies. The question we engage is whether fi rms are taking advantage of this option.
III. STUDY DESIGN
A. Overview
As discussed above, U.S. tax rules may encourage a U.S.-headquartered MNC to adopt a tax-haven-parented structure. But to what extent have U.S.-headquartered MNCs in fact used tax-haven-parented structures, and has their use of these structures changed over time? These questions motivate our study. We seek to test two hypotheses. First, do U.S.-headquartered MNCs incorporate in tax havens prior to an IPO? Second, are U.S.-headquartered fi rms responsible for the previously documented increase in the proportion of fi rms conducting U.S. IPOs that are incorporated in tax havens?
B. Use of IPO Data to Study Incorporation Location Decision
Our study examines fi rms that conducted IPOs on U.S.-based exchanges between 1997 and 2010. We choose this set of fi rms because: (1) it has been previously cited as support for the proposition that more U.S.-headquartered MNCs have begun to incorporate outside the United States, and in particular in tax havens (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010; Shaviro, 2011) ; (2) IPO fi lings contain not only data about incorporation location and listed headquarters, but also information that can be used to evaluate the "true" natural headquarters of a fi rm; (3) since IPO fi rms are often relatively young, use of the IPO sample allows us to observe the incorporation status of many fi rms relatively close to their original incorporation date; and (4) examining U.S. IPO fi rms will capture the U.S.-headquartered multinational population that we are interested in, under the assumption that MNCs are large enough to prioritize access to public equity markets.
Selection bias affects our sample to a limited extent. First, our sample excludes fi rms that do not conduct an IPO. Therefore we are unable to observe the incorporation decisions of fi rms who fail, are acquired prior to listing, or remain private. We have little reason to think that fi rms that fail or experience a strategic acquisition are more likely to choose tax-haven incorporation compared to fi rms that conduct an IPO. But it is possible that that a fi rm that plans to stay private may be more likely to choose tax-haven incorporation compared to fi rms that conduct an IPO. For example, it is possible that corporate governance and shareholders' rights offered by U.S. incorporation are more important for shareholders of a publicly held corporation than for owners of a closely held fi rm.
A second source of potential bias is that, although our sample includes fi rms that conduct an IPO on a U.S. exchange simultaneously with an offering on a non-U.S. exchange, we do not examine the incorporation decisions of fi rms that do not list on a U.S. exchange. There has been a signifi cant drop in IPOs conducted on U.S. exchanges in recent years, and a concurrent increase on non-U.S. exchanges. If this dynamic is driven by U.S.-headquartered fi rms conducting their IPO on foreign markets, and these fi rms incorporate in tax havens, then our analysis would undercount the number of U.S.-headquartered fi rms that incorporate in tax havens.
In concurrent research, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stultz (2012) examine the drivers of the growth of IPOs outside of the U.S. They show that the number of fi rms conducting an IPO only outside of their domestic market has grown from 55 in 1990 to 734 in 2007, with the associated proceeds increasing from $8.8 billion to $168.8 billion. While the authors do not document the total number of U.S. fi rms in this group, they do show that U.S. fi rms that do not list on a U.S. market generate only 7 percent of the total proceeds from these issuances. They conclude that the growth of IPOs outside the United States is driven predominantly by non-U.S. fi rms conducting IPOs outside of U.S. exchanges. As a result, we do not believe our focus on U.S.-listed IPO fi rms omits a meaningful number of U.S.-headquartered MNCs.
1
A fi nal limitation with our study design is that each observation in our data set typically relates to an incorporation decision taken several years prior to the IPO date and therefore lags incorporation decisions made in response to historical developments. As a result, any decisions made in response to legislative changes in the recent past will most likely not be refl ected in the data. For example, the observations of U.S-headquartered, tax-haven-incorporated fi rms are composed mainly of fi rms that incorporated prior to the 2004 enactment of I.R.C. Section 7874, which severely curtails the ability of a U.S.-parented MNC to invert into a non-U.S. parent structure.
C. Default Incorporation Jurisdiction Assumption
Others have identifi ed the challenge of identifying the counterfactual case of those fi rms that would have incorporated in the United States but for U.S. corporate tax rules (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010) . We address this problem by assuming that the default jurisdiction of incorporation is the headquarters jurisdiction of the fi rm. This is consistent with a body of related corporate governance literature that fi nds a signifi cant homestate advantage and a largely binary incorporation location choice between the home state and Delaware for U.S. fi rms (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003; Daines, 2002) . Thus a decision by a U.S. fi rm to incorporate in the United States indicates that corporate tax, regulatory or other incentives are not suffi cient to motivate non-U.S. incorporation. Alternatively, a decision by a U.S.-headquartered fi rm to incorporate in a tax-haven jurisdiction suggests that U.S. tax or other incentives are strong enough to motivate non-U.S. incorporation.
D. Sample Construction and Identifi cation of Tax Havens
To build our sample, we collect a listing of all initial public offerings on a stock exchange in the United States from the Thomson Financial Services Database (also known as Securities Data Company (SDC)) between 1997 and 2010. Table 1 details the sample construction. Panel A documents our initial sample of 2,911 IPOs after screening for missing data and eliminating certain investment funds. Panel B documents our collection of U.S.-headquartered fi rms within the larger sample. We identify 2,587 fi rms coded by SDC as U.S.-headquartered. We then examine the prospectuses of the 324 fi rms shown by SDC as headquartered elsewhere to ensure that the non-U.S.-headquartered coding is correct. 2 We classify all fi rms that disclose their principal offi ce or more than 50 percent of their employees, fl oor area, or revenue in the United States as being headquartered in the United States. This results in the identifi cation of 35 additional U.S.-headquartered fi rms.
Panel C shows our identifi cation of U.S.-headquartered MNCs. We use information provided by the 2011 Compustat fundamentals annual database to fi nd evidence of foreign operations. Table 1 , panel C documents this process. Of the 2,622 U.S.-headquartered IPO fi rms, we fi nd 918 fi rms that show evidence of global operations. We code a fi rm with the selected screens equal to "missing" as purely domestic. As it is likely that at least some of the "missing" fi rms have foreign revenues, but do not specifi cally break out geographic information in their segment disclosures, we are likely undercounting the true number of MNCs. From SDC we obtain the fi rm name, issue date, SIC code, country of incorporation (item "Country of Incorporation" or "State of Incorporation"), and headquarters country (item "Nation"). We eliminate all offerings which were not the fi rms' initial IPO (SDC category "Original IPO" equal to "No"), as well as 18 offerings that are duplicated in the database. We note 899 offerings that are missing the country of incorporation in SDC. For these offerings we manually review the fi rms' prospectus (i.e. form S-1, F-1, S-11, N-2, etc.) to collect the country of incorporation at the time of offering. We obtain this information for all but 259 of the offerings. We also eliminate all depository and non-depository credit institutions (SIC Codes 6000-6199), real estate investment trusts (6798), closed-end management investment offi ces (6726), open-end management investment offi ces (6722), and other investors (6799). This leaves us with 2,911 fi rms with the countries of headquarters and incorporation identifi ed.
Panel B:
We note that SDC typically uses the address given by the fi rm as the principal executive offi ce to determine the headquarters country. To expand the defi nition of U.S.-headquartered fi rms, we review the prospectuses for all 324 fi rms not incorporated in the United States to fi nd evidence that the fi rm is effectively domiciled in the United States. We apply four screens to make this determination: (1) address of the principal executive offi ce; (2) percentage of employees located in the United States; (3) percentage of fl oor area located in the United States; and (4) percentage of revenue generated in the United States. For the last three screens, if the percentage is greater than 50%, we code the fi rm as having a headquarters in the United States. This results in coding an additional 35 fi rms as U.S.-headquartered.
Panel C:
We use the fi rm's CUSIP number from SDC to obtain the GVKEY from the 2011 version of the Compustat fundamentals annual database. For fi rms that could not be identifi ed in this manner we collect the CIK number from the SEC's EDGAR database and use it to identify the GVKEY in Compustat. For each fi rm we obtain the ending total assets (item AT), closing share price (PRCC_F), common shares (CSHO), and net income (NI) for the fi rst fi scal year end after the conclusion of the IPO. We require that each fi rm have non-missing item AT for inclusion in the sample, leaving 2,465 fi rms available for analysis. For these fi rms we code each that reports a non-zero amount of pre-tax foreign income (Compustat item PIFO), foreign deferred tax liability (item TXDFO), or foreign tax expense (item TXFO) in the year of IPO or the subsequent three years as having foreign operations. If all of those amounts are zero or missing we code the fi rm as having solely domestic income. 
IV. RESULTS
A. Summary
Our results are divided into three sections. First, we report the frequency with which U.S.-headquartered MNCs in our data set incorporate in tax-haven jurisdictions. We consider a fi rm to be incorporated in a tax haven if the incorporation country is classifi ed as such by Dharmapala and Hines (2009) . 3 We also show descriptive data comparing U.S.-headquartered MNCs with tax-haven-incorporated parents to U.S.-headquartered MNCs with U.S.-incorporated parents. Second, we examine the previously noted increase of U.S.-listed IPO fi rms incorporating in tax havens (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010) , and document where the fi rms driving this increase are headquartered. Finally, we list and describe the characteristics of the U.S.-headquartered fi rms that we fi nd are important in the decision to incorporate in a tax-haven jurisdiction.
B. U.S.-Headquartered MNCs Overwhelmingly Incorporate in the United States
In this paper, we generally consider U.S.-headquartered fi rms' incorporation decisions as a binary choice between U.S. incorporation and tax-haven incorporation. A third choice, non-U.S., non-tax-haven incorporation, is also an option. Some anecdotal evidence of recent examples of the approach of non-U.S., non-tax-haven incorporation exists (Webber, 2011) . Before turning to the United States-versus-tax-haven choice, we briefl y consider the possibility that multinational fi rms in our sample choose to incorporate outside the United States, but not in tax havens, by examining the 918 U.S.-headquartered MNCs that we identify. Table 2 presents the results. Of the 918 identifi ed U.S.-headquartered MNCs in the sample, 44 incorporate outside the United States. Of these 44 fi rms, 17, or 2 percent of the total sample, incorporate in a non-U.S. country that is not a tax haven. 4 Israel is the only non-tax-haven country with more than a 1 percent share of the fi rms that incorporate outside the United States. Therefore, while the results indicate that a U.S.-headquartered MNC is overwhelmingly likely to incorporate in the United States, if it does not, it is most likely to incorporate in a tax haven.
We focus the remainder of our analysis on the choice between tax-haven and U.S. incorporation. This focus not only includes the majority of non-U.S. incorporation location choices made by U.S.-headquartered MNCs, but also responds directly to the prediction of an increase in U.S.-headquartered, tax-haven-incorporated fi rms as a result of onerous U.S. federal income tax rules (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010; Shaviro, 2011) . Table 3 shows the number of MNCs headquartered in the United States that incorporate in a tax haven compared to the total number of MNCs headquartered in the United States and incorporated in the United States or a tax haven. Table 3 's analysis does not include the 17 MNCs headquartered in the U.S. and incorporated in non-U.S., non-tax-haven locations. The overall number of tax-haven-incorporated fi rms in this subsample of issuers is only 27 out of 901, or 3 percent. Even if we assume that the additional 20 tax-haven fi rms that were missing evidence of foreign operations in Compustat are multinationals, and that no non-tax-haven fi rms missing information were multinationals, the percentage of U.S.-headquartered MNCs that choose to incorporate in tax havens would only increase to just over 5 percent.
In some years, the percentage of tax-haven-incorporated fi rms is higher. For example, it is 16 percent in 2002 and 9 percent in 2009. However, in both of those years, the absolute number of tax-haven fi rms is only three and two, respectively. The higher percentage in those years refl ects the low number of total IPOs as opposed to an increase in the occurrence of U.S. MNCs incorporating in tax havens. The results indicate that U.S.-headquartered MNCs have not made the decision to incorporate in tax havens prior to an IPO in signifi cant numbers.
As noted in Panel C of Table 1 , of the 918 multinational, U.S.-headquartered IPO fi rms that we identify, 588 have suffi cient information about non-U.S. income to permit a comparison of the fi nancial characteristics of different fi rms. In keeping with our binary Notes: See Table 1 for sample description. A fi rm is classifi ed as incorporated in a tax haven jurisdiction if the 2 digit country code corresponds to a country listed as a tax haven by Hines (2009, p. 1067 ); see footnote 3 for a list of these countries.
comparison, we focus on a subsample of 575 fi rms that are incorporated either in a tax haven or in the United States for the analysis. As Table 4 shows, 19 of these 575 fi rms are incorporated in a tax haven. Compared to fi rms not incorporated in tax havens, the tax-haven fi rms have signifi cantly larger average assets (ASSETS t of $1.7 billion versus about $800 million) and market capitalization (SIZE t of $3.1 billion versus $1.3 billion). They are also more profi table, as average return on assets (INC t ) in the year of the IPO is 0.03 versus -0.04 for the U.S.-incorporated fi rms. Our data show research and development intensity (R&D) that is slightly higher for U.S.-incorporated fi rms, but this difference is not statistically signifi cant. Finally, the tax-haven incorporated fi rms have a higher ratio of foreign income to total income (FORINC of 0.64 versus 0.23). This suggests that the U.S.-headquartered fi rms that incorporate in tax havens are the fi rms that expect to realize relatively larger benefi ts from the reduction of U.S. tax on their non-U.S., and perhaps also their U.S., Table 3 Comparison of U.S-Headquartered MNCs that Incorporate in Tax Table 1 for the sample description and footnote 3 for the list of tax havens.
income. However, the results also show that U.S.-incorporated MNCs still exhibit material foreign operations (FORINC of 0.23) which indicates that there may be a substantial number of U.S.-headquartered fi rms that could reap some tax benefi ts from incorporating in a tax haven, yet do not make that choice.
C. Chinese-and Hong Kong-Headquartered Firms Drive Increase in Tax-HavenIncorporation Trend
We next examine the hypothesis that U.S.-headquartered fi rms are responsible for the previously documented increase in the proportion of fi rms conducting U.S. IPOs that are incorporated in tax havens (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010) . We use the larger sample of all U.S. IPOs from 1997-2010, as shown in panel A of Table 1 , to consider this question. The use of the larger sample, not screened for evidence of multinational activity, is consistent with the approach in Desai and Dharmapala. Notes: Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. Signifi cance is calculated using Satterthwaite standard errors. See Table 1 for the sample description, and footnote 3 for the list of tax havens. Variable defi nitions are as follows: ASSETS t is the total assets at the end of year t (item AT ); SIZE is the price per share at the end of the year (PRCC_F ) multiplied by common shares outstanding (CSHO); INC t is net income (NI )/AT; FORINC is the average of pre-tax foreign income (PIFO) divided by total pre-tax income (PI) from years t to t+3; and RD is Research and Developent Expense (XRD) divided by ending total assets (AT ) in the year of IPO. If XRD is missing, we code XRD as equal to zero. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Table 5 provides a breakdown of the U.S. IPO fi rms that incorporate in tax havens. We fi nd that Chinese-, Greek-, and Hong Kong-headquartered fi rms are responsible for about 60 percent of the instances of tax-haven-incorporated fi rms conducting U.S. IPOs. Chinese-and Hong Kong-headquartered fi rms make up more than half of such fi rms, or 111 out of 210. Figure 1 duplicates the results obtained by Desai and Dharmapala (2010) and shows that the proportion of U.S. IPO fi rms incorporated in tax havens increased dramatically around 2002. But, as Figure 1 also shows, the frequency of U.S.-headquartered fi rms incorporating in tax havens has increased only slightly over our sample period. Chineseand Hong Kong-headquartered issuers, not U.S.-headquartered issuers, drive the recent dramatic proportional increase in tax-haven-incorporated fi rms conducting U.S. IPOs.
The fi nding that Chinese-and Hong Kong-headquartered fi rms regularly incorporate in tax-haven jurisdictions 5 has possible relevance to future research about whether U.S.-headquartered fi rms might at some point begin to regularly incorporate in tax havens or, more generally, outside the United States. In the case of Chinese-and Hong Kong-headquartered fi rms, there are several non-tax reasons that may support tax haven incorporation. These include legislative restrictions relating to foreign ownership of Chinese-incorporated fi rms, shareholder and creditor rights, listing approval, and foreign exchange convertibility (Howson and Khanna, 2010) . In addition, the high quality and Notes: No other country comprises more than 1 percent of the tax-haven sample. See Table 1 for the sample description, and footnote 3 for the list of tax havens.
fl exibility of tax havens' corporate governance regimes may increase the attractiveness of tax-haven incorporation (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009) . Tax considerations may also play a role. First, the tax savings attributable to tax havens' low or zero corporate tax rates increases the likelihood of tax-haven incorporation rather than incorporation in the U.S. or other countries. Domestic tax issues may also have relevance. Prior to the repeal of Chinese foreign direct investment incentives in 2007, Chinese investors had an incentive to "round-trip" their capital into China using nonChinese investment vehicles to take advantage of these incentives (Li, 2007) . Even after
Figure 1
Ratios of Tax-Haven-Incorporated Issuers to Total Issuers Notes: The total sample trend line has a slope of 0.018 (t-value=8.33***), the "no China or Hong Kong HQ" trend line has a slope of 0.004 (t-value=3.93***), and the "U.S.-headquarters only" trend line has a slope of 1.06, where three asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% level. See Table 1 for the sample description. With the above discussion we are not attempting to conclusively answer the question as to why Chinese-and Hong Kong-based fi rms have increasingly incorporated in tax havens. Rather, by introducing possible reasons for this development we hope to suggest directions for future research into the question of why some fi rms incorporate in tax havens, and others do not.
D. U.S.-Headquartered, Tax-Haven-Incorporated Firms
We identify 47 U.S.-headquartered, tax-haven-incorporated fi rms in our larger sample of 2,911 MNCs.
6 Table 6 lists these fi rms. In each case, a number of tax and non-tax decisions could have infl uenced the tax-haven-incorporation decision. We do not claim that tax considerations were the predominant driver for any of these fi rms' incorporation decision. Rather, we propose that the existence of these 47 fi rms leaves open the possibility that tax advantages of tax-haven incorporation may be infl uential factors in incorporation decisions for at least some fi rms. Of these 47 fi rms, 17 incorporated in, or after, 2004, the year in which the U.S. enacted stringent anti-inversion legislation.
First, we observe a tendency of U.S.-headquartered corporations in particular lines of business, such as insurance or marine transportation, to incorporate in tax-haven locations. Of the 47 fi rms, 13 are insurance carriers, and four are engaged in marine transportation. For both of these industries, specifi c and favorable tax provisions suggest that corporate tax incentives provide some of the reasons for fi rms' choice of tax-haven-parented structures.
In the case of insurance, it is possible for a tax-haven parent to minimize taxation on passive portfolio income such as interest and dividends, in part because of the low or zero tax-haven rate. A tax-haven parent may also avoid having any business income taxed by the United States and may arrange for the U.S. subsidiary to make deductible payments to the tax-haven parent, thus eroding the income tax base of the U.S. subsidiary. If the tax-haven parent is incorporated in Bermuda, the goal of avoiding taxation of the tax-haven parent by the United States may be facilitated by tax treaties that permit the use of a taxpayer-favorable permanent establishment provision specifically applicable to the insurance business (Elliott, 2005) . Section 4371 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes excise taxes on premiums paid to a foreign insurer of 4 percent for some policy types including property and casualty and 1 percent for reinsurance and other policy types including life insurance. These excise taxes are subject to reduction under tax treaties, although IRS guidance limits the extent to which tax treaty relief can be claimed (Ocasal, Miles, and Tello, 2009 ). In some cases, premiums paid to a foreign reinsurer may escape state excise tax; non-tax regulatory concerns, such as the possibility of relaxed investment requirements, may also encourage tax-haven incorporation for some insurance fi rms (Bissell, 2003) . Shipping companies with tax-haven parents can take advantage of a different provision of U.S. law, which exempts income from the international operation of a ship from U.S. income tax if earned by a foreign corporation resident in a country that declines to tax similar income earned by U.S. corporations (Glicklich and Miller, 2012) . Regulatory reasons may also encourage the use of non-U.S. shipping fl ags for certain types of shipping businesses. U.S. statutory law limits some commerce, such as "coastwise" shipping between two U.S. ports, to U.S.-fl agged vessels. For commerce not so limited, non-U.S. registration may provide an advantage for non-tax regulatory reasons including possible avoidance of applicable labor regulations, union contracts, and requirements to use U.S. shipyards for vessel construction (Semenoro, 2000) as well as avoiding exposure to the choice of law doctrine that may require a U.S. forum in the event of worker injury for a U.S.-registered ship (Gilmore and Black, 1975) .
Other companies, not in the insurance or shipping industries, appear to have made an internal decision to incorporate in tax havens. These include Accenture Ltd., the Arthur , 1997-2010 Andersen consulting spinoff, Lazard Ltd., the investment bank, and TyCom Ltd., a spinoff from Tyco International, which had previously expatriated (Desai and Hines, 2002) . They also include Fresh Del Monte Produce Ltd. and Bunge Ltd., companies with signifi cant agricultural operations outside the United States. Finally, several of the companies we study conducted IPOs after a going-private transaction previously established a tax-haven parent. These include Seagate Technology Holdings and Herbalife Ltd. The going-private transactions highlight the possibility that market participants such as private equity investors, or advisors such as particular law fi rms or investment banks, infl uence the decision to incorporate in a tax haven. Analogous market participant infl uence appears to affect some other fi rm decisions, such as those relating to takeover defense (Coates, 2001 ) and the use of "supercharged IPO" structures (Fleischer and Staudt, 2012) .
There are at least two interesting aspects of the market participant story. First, it is possible that some market participants have specifi c interests or priorities that encourage tax-haven incorporation. Private equity fi rms might prioritize tax savings over corporate governance protections, for example. Second, if the decision to incorporate in a tax haven is mediated by communities of market participants, or their advisors that share advice and norms and imitate structures, this may affect how a change in behavior might come about. For example, a change in U.S.-based startups' incorporation decisions may gather momentum quickly if an infl uential group of investors or advisors concludes that the default jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. startups should be outside the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
Using data on fi rms conducting IPOs in the United States between 1997 and 2010, we examine two hypotheses. First, we consider whether U.S.-headquartered MNCs incorporate in tax havens, and provide evidence that they do not. Out of the 918 U.S.-headquartered MNCs that we identify, only 27 incorporate in tax havens. This suggests that some fi rms that could benefi t from tax savings provided by tax-haven incorporation do not take advantage of this strategy.
Second, we test the hypothesis, suggested in Desai and Dharmapala (2010) , that a recent increase in the proportion of U.S. IPO fi rms incorporated in tax havens shows that U.S.-headquartered fi rms have increasingly begun to incorporate in tax havens. To test this second hypothesis, we use a larger sample of 2,911 fi rms. We fi nd that the proportion of fi rms conducting IPOs in the United States that are incorporated in tax havens began to increase around 2002, consistent with Desai and Dharmapala. However, we fi nd that only 47 U.S.-headquartered fi rms incorporate in a tax haven, and that fi rms headquartered outside the United States, in particular, in China and Hong Kong, drive the trend of increasing incorporation in tax havens.
Future research might focus on providing a better idea of how fi rms make incorporation location decisions. In particular, better defi ning how capital formation and home or host country corporate governance and regulatory regimes impact the choice of incorpora-tion would help provide a better framework for evaluating how tax regimes infl uence incorporation location choice. Additionally, studying institutional factors, such as the variance of incorporation location choice cross-sectionally across industries, may help predict how fi rms will respond to changes in tax or other rules.
